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ARTICLES 
RE-EVALUATING CORPORATE CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY: THE DOJ’S INTERNAL MORAL 
CULPABILITY STANDARD FOR CORPORATE 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
Lucian E. Dervan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1909, the scope of American criminal jurisprudence was 
forever changed by the creation of corporate criminal liability in 
the landmark decision New York Central & Hudson River Rail-
road Co. v. United States.1 New York Central, however, was only 
the beginning of corporate criminal liability’s evolution. Over the 
next one hundred years, numerous appellate courts interpreted 
the Supreme Court’s conclusion that a corporation could not be 
immune from ‚all punishment because of the old and exploded 
doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a crime‛2 to create a 
plethora of precedent establishing an exceedingly low bar for lia-
bility.3  
  
 * © 2011, Lucian E. Dervan. All rights reserved. Assistant Professor of Law, South-
ern Illinois University School of Law. J.D., with high honors, Emory University School of 
Law, 2002; B.A., cum laude, Davidson College, 1998. Order of the Coif; former law clerk to 
the Honorable Phyllis A. Kravitch of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit; former member of the King & Spalding LLP Special Matters and Government 
Investigations Team. Special thanks to Professors Ellen Podgor, Joan Heminway, and 
Andrew Taslitz for selecting my Article for inclusion in the 2010 Southeastern Association 
of Law Schools’ roundtable discussion on ‚Re-evaluating Corporate Criminal Liability.‛ 
Thanks also to all of the other participants in the roundtable from whom I learned a great 
deal. 
 1. 212 U.S. 481 (1909); see Jerold H. Israel, Ellen S. Podgor, Paul D. Borman & Peter 
J. Henning, White Collar Crime: Law and Practice 53 (3d ed., West 2009) (discussing the 
history of corporate criminal liability). 
 2. N.Y. Central, 212 U.S. at 495–496. 
 3. See Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think about the Punishment of Corpora-
tions, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1359, 1363 (2009) (observing that after N.Y. Central, courts 
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Currently, corporate criminal liability attaches upon a mea-
ger showing of respondeat superior, a tort concept only requiring 
that an employee’s or agent’s actions (a) are within the scope of 
his or her duties and (b) are intended, even if only in part, to ben-
efit the corporation.4 The standard is so de minimis that it allows 
a corporation to be held criminally liable even if (a) the criminal 
behavior was perpetrated by a low-level, rogue employee without 
upper-level management’s knowledge; (b) the perpetrator was 
explicitly instructed by the corporation not to engage in the con-
duct and was directly violating established company policy; and 
(c) the company had an established and effective compliance pro-
gram in place at the time of the offense and the conduct came to 
light because of such compliance program.5  
As might be expected from the description above, the two-
prong approach to corporate criminal liability has engendered 
great disfavor among various groups, most notably academics and 
the criminal-defense bar. Both argue in part that the standard is 
too easily satisfied.6 As one commentator remarked, ‚[T]he crimi-
nal case against a corporation, once there is evidence that even a 
  
frequently imposed corporate criminal liability despite the legislature’s silence on the 
issue). 
 4. See In re Hellenic, Inc., 252 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2001) (‚An agent’s knowledge is 
imputed to the corporation [when] the agent is acting within the scope of his authority and 
[when] the knowledge relates to matters within the scope of that authority.‛ (footnote 
omitted)); United States v. 7326 Hwy. 45 N., 965 F.2d 311, 316 (7th Cir. 1992) (‚[A]cting 
within the scope of employment means ‘with intent to benefit the employer.’‛ (citations 
omitted)); Memo. from Paul J. McNulty, Dep. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Heads of 
Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organiza-
tions 2 (2006) (available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf) 
(‚Corporations are ‘legal persons,’ capable of suing and being sued, and capable of commit-
ting crimes. . . . To hold a corporation liable for these actions, the government must 
establish that the corporate agent’s actions ([i]) were within the scope of his duties and (ii) 
were intended, at least in part, to benefit the corporation.‛); Dane C. Ball & Daniel E. 
Bolia, Ending a Decade of Federal Prosecutorial Abuse in the Corporate Criminal Charging 
Decision, 9 Wyo. L. Rev. 229, 234 (2009) (stating that ‚if a criminal act benefits only the 
employee, officer, or director, vicarious liability does not apply‛ (footnote omitted)). 
 5. See Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul:  
Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 53, 64–
65 (2007) (describing situations in which a corporation is criminally liable); Pamela H. 
Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does It Make Sense? 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1437, 
1441 (2009) (observing situations in which a corporation may be held criminally liable 
despite best efforts to prevent wrongdoing and in the absence of any benefit to the corpora-
tion). 
 6. See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Crimi-
nal Liability, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1095, 1096 (1991) (noting that commentators are skeptical 
of using criminal prosecution to punish corporations).  
File: Dervan C5(b) Created on: 10/26/2011 12:29:00 PM Last Printed: 11/12/2011 2:15:00 PM 
2011] Re-Evaluating Corporate Criminal Liability 9 
single low-level employee engaged in criminal activity on the job, 
is virtually bulletproof.‛7 Another has written, ‚Prosecutors have 
inordinate leverage due to the current application of the doctrine 
of vicarious liability. A single low-level employee’s criminal con-
duct can be sufficient to trigger criminal liability on the part of 
the corporation.‛8  
But what is at the heart of this discomfort and unease with 
the current standard? Certainly there are other aspects of crimi-
nal law that assist the prosecution in its task and lower the 
applicable threshold for conviction. Examples include conspiracy 
law and strict-liability offenses.9 Perhaps then it is not the ease 
with which the respondeat superior standard may be met, but 
rather that the test, borrowed directly from tort law, wholly  
ignores a fundamental tenet of criminal jurisprudence present in 
crimes applicable to individuals: moral culpability.10 
II. MORAL CULPABILITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF 
DESERVING PUNISHMENT 
For individuals, there are two fundamental requirements for 
criminal liability. First, the individual must engage in conduct 
that creates moral culpability, which means it is conduct ‚deserv-
ing of punishment.‛11 Second, the morally culpable conduct must 
  
 7. Bharara, supra n. 5, at 76. 
 8. Andrew Weissmann, A New Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability, 44 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 1319, 1320 (2007). 
 9. Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 34 
Ariz. L. Rev. 743, 747 (1992) (explaining that ‚[a]s the proliferation of strict[-]liability 
offenses attests, the principle of responsibility is not absolute, and some commentators see 
the growth of strict liability as a repudiation of the traditional link between culpability 
and punishment‛ (footnote omitted)); Herbert Wechsler, William Kenneth Jones & Harold 
L. Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law 
Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 957, 959–960 (1961) 
(describing the prosecutorial advantages of a conspiracy charge). 
 10. See Bharara, supra n. 5, at 63 (noting that ‚there has been even some judicial 
recognition that corporate criminal law wears the garment of vicarious liability somewhat 
like an ill-fitting hand-me-down, but significantly, courts have accepted the tradeoffs  
between legal coherence and crime prevention‛); Bucy, supra n. 6, at 1114–1115 (discuss-
ing N.Y. Central’s flaw of failing to appreciate the inherently different nature of civil and 
criminal law). 
 11. John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Crim-
inal Liability, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1329, 1330 (2009); William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, 
Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and Variants of Vicarious Liability, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 
1285, 1289 (2000). 
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have been made criminal.12 With regard to corporate criminality, 
the second tenet is arguably satisfied by the respondeat superior 
standard. The conduct that has been made criminal is any situa-
tion in which a corporation’s employee or agent engages in 
criminal conduct within the scope of his or her duties and with 
the intent to benefit the corporation. The first tenet, however, is 
wholly ignored, and the current standard allows conviction of cor-
porations when the entity has engaged in no morally culpable 
behavior.13 As an example, consider the moral distinction between 
a corporation whose board of directors encourages employees to 
engage in illegal behavior and a corporation that, through utiliz-
ing an effective compliance program, discovers and punishes a 
rogue employee who acted against direct corporate and manag-
erial instructions to the contrary. Should each of these corpora-
tions be viewed as equally guilty under the law? Just as one 
would feel great discomfort if an individual were convicted of  
engaging in conduct that did not deserve punishment, there is a 
sense of great unease when corporations suffer this precise fate.  
It is at this point in the analysis of corporate criminal liability 
when some commentators argue that corporations should simply 
not be subject to criminal liability because they, as fictitious enti-
ties, cannot be morally culpable.14 This premise should be 
rejected, however, because corporations act as persons under the 
law and must be treated accordingly.15 Further, it is vital to soci-
ety that entities as powerful as corporations be accountable for 
their actions in both the civil and criminal arenas.16 Therefore, to 
  
 12. See Bharara, supra n. 5, at 57 (explaining that a corporation is criminally liable 
only for the illegal acts of an employee). 
 13. See Matt Senko, Prosecutorial Overreaching in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 
19 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 163, 184 (2009) (arguing that ‚[t]he abrogation of the intent  
requirement for corporate defendants destabilizes the essential framework of criminal 
justice by punishing those who have no subjective culpability‛). 
 14. See Bucy, supra n. 5, at 1440 (discussing the reasons why some argue corporations, 
as fictional entities, should not be prosecuted); Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of 
Entity Criminal Liability, 81 Ind. L.J. 473, 475 (2006) (explaining that academics have 
criticized corporate criminal liability because of ‚the impossibility of fitting liberal concepts 
about responsibility with nonhuman actors‛). 
 15. See e.g. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (‚In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress 
. . . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations . . . .‛).  
 16. See Bucy, supra n. 5, at 1437 (stating that corporations should be prosecuted  
because they ‚often engage in activity that harms lots of people‛); see generally Joan Mac-
Leod Heminway, Enron’s Tangled Web: Complex Relationships; Unanswered Questions, 71 
U. Cin. L. Rev. 1167 (2003) (discussing the effects of the Enron affair).  
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alleviate the discomfort surrounding current corporate criminal 
liability, a moral culpability element must be added to the exist-
ing two-prong respondeat superior standard.17 But how does one 
establish whether a corporation’s actions have satisfied a moral 
culpability element? 
Pamela Bucy addressed just this issue in her 1991 article  
entitled Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate 
Criminal Liability.18 In her article, Bucy argued that corporations 
have distinct and identifiable personalities or ‚ethos,‛ and that 
only organizations with ethos that encouraged employees or 
agents to commit criminal acts should be held criminally account-
able under the law.19 Interestingly, Bucy advanced the following 
eight factors for consideration in determining whether a corporate 
ethos encouraged criminal conduct:  
(1) Was the corporation organized in a manner that  
encouraged the criminal conduct? 
(2) Were goals set by the corporation that encouraged  
illegal behavior? 
(3) Were corporate employees educated about legal  
requirements? 
(4) Were legal requirements monitored? 
(5) Who was involved in the criminal conduct, and was it 
‚recklessly tolerated‛ by higher echelon officials? 
(6) How did the corporation react to past violations of the 
law and individual violators? 
(7) Were there compensation incentives for legally inap-
propriate behavior? 
  
 17. Amendments to the common law test for vicarious liability could be achieved  
either through judicial or legislative action.  
 18. Bucy, supra n. 6, at 1099. Though Bucy described her proposed theory as address-
ing a lack of ‚intent‛ in the respondeat superior standard, for ease of discussion this 
Article will examine her proposal as one that can be generically described as a culpability 
element.  
 19. Id.  
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(8) Are there indemnification practices that encourage 
criminal conduct?20 
Bucy proposed that corporate criminal liability should attach if 
these factors indicate that the corporate ethos encouraged the 
employee’s or agent’s criminal conduct.21 
III. MORAL CULPABILITY AND THE DOJ’S PRINCIPLES OF 
PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 
Though today’s Department of Justice would likely challenge 
Bucy’s proposed modification of the respondeat superior test, it 
cannot deny that moral culpability should at least be considered 
before criminal charges are levied against a corporate defendant. 
This is because, although Bucy’s culpability factors have not been 
incorporated into the common law, the Department of Justice has 
essentially mimicked this moral culpability analysis in its Prin-
ciples of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 
(‚Principles of Prosecution‛).22  
The Principles of Prosecution, which was first issued by then 
Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder on June 16, 1999, listed 
eight factors for consideration before criminally charging a corpo-
ration.23 The memorandum has undergone several iterations since 
its initial release, but the basic structure of the nine core prin-
ciples have remained the same.24 The factors for consideration by 
the Department of Justice are: 
  
 20. Id. at 1129–1146. 
 21. Id. at 1128. 
 22. See Laufer & Strudler, supra n. 11, at 1303 (noting that ‚throughout the [federal 
prosecutorial guidelines], prosecutors are cautioned about resorting to vicarious liability 
[if] it would be unfairly strict to the ‘corporate person’‛).  
 23. Memo. from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Dep. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Heads of 
Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys, Bringing Criminal Charges against Corporations 3 
(June 16, 1999) (available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/ 
1999/charging-corps.PDF). The memorandum from Holder was later amended by Deputy 
Attorney General Larry Thompson, who changed the title to Principles of Federal Prosecu-
tion of Business Organizations. Memo. from Larry D. Thompson, Dep. Att’y Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Just., to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prose-
cution of Business Organizations 1 (Jan. 20, 2003) (available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/ 
cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm). 
 24. Memo. from Larry D. Thompson, supra n. 23, at 3; Memo. from Paul J. McNulty, 
supra n. 4, at 4. 
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1. the nature and seriousness of the offense, including 
the risk of harm to the public, and applicable policies 
and priorities, if any, governing the prosecution of cor-
porations for particular categories of crime;  
2. the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corpora-
tion, including the complicity in, or condonation of, the 
wrongdoing by corporate management;  
3. the corporation’s history of similar conduct, including 
prior criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement  
actions against it;  
4. the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of 
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the  
investigation of its agents;  
5. the existence and adequacy of the corporation’s pre-
existing compliance program;  
6. the corporation’s remedial actions, including any  
efforts to implement an effective corporate compliance 
program or to improve an existing one, to replace  
responsible management, to discipline or terminate 
wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate with 
the relevant government agencies;  
7. collateral consequences, including disproportionate 
harm to shareholders, pension holders and employees 
not proven personally culpable and impact on the pub-
lic arising from the prosecution;  
8. the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals respon-
sible for the corporation’s malfeasance; and  
9. the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory 
enforcement actions.25 
These Department of Justice principles and the Bucy culpa-
bility factors are strikingly similar. Perhaps this explains the 
great divide between a dissatisfied academy and defense bar and 
a seemingly content law-enforcement body. The Department of 
Justice is not concerned with the lack of moral culpability in the 
common law corporate criminal liability standard because it has 
  
 25. Memo. from Paul J. McNulty, supra n. 4, at 4 (internal cross-references omitted) 
(emphasis in original).  
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implemented a moral culpability element on its own and requires 
that it be considered before bringing any criminal charges.26  
Maybe corporations should be satisfied that despite the reluc-
tance of the courts to revise the standard established in New York 
Central over one hundred years ago to incorporate a moral culpa-
bility element, the Department of Justice has seen fit to 
implement a new standard on its own volition. There are,  
however, two fundamental flaws with allowing the status quo to 
suffice.  
First, while the government’s consideration of the Principles 
of Prosecution may be ‚mandatory,‛ these guidelines create no 
legal rights for corporate defendants.27 In fact, since the Principles 
of Prosecution is technically found within the United States Attor-
neys’ Manual, the following disclaimer contained in the 
introduction applies to any attempt to enforce this additional 
moral culpability element to the basic respondeat superior stan-
dard:  
The Manual provides only internal Department of Justice 
guidance. It is not intended to, does not, and may not be  
relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, 
enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or crimi-
nal. Nor are any limitations hereby placed on otherwise 
lawful litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice.28 
While the Department of Justice’s actions to incorporate consid-
eration of moral culpability should be applauded, moral 
culpability should be a fundamental aspect of the common law 
test rather than an unenforceable aspiration on the part of the 
prosecuting entity. Furthermore, because the Principles of Prose-
cution is an internal departmental document, the Department of 
Justice retains the ability to amend it at any given point, includ-
ing in ways that are viewed as inappropriate or even 
  
 26. See Laufer & Strudler, supra n. 11, at 1305 (recognizing that the federal prosecu-
torial guidelines reflect prosecutors’ abandonment of traditional vicarious liability rules in 
favor of new set of rules focusing on moral culpability).  
 27. Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing “Discretionary Jus-
tice”, 13 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Policy 167, 170 (2004).  
 28. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual § 1-1.100 (updated May 
2009) (available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title1/1mdoj 
.htm).  
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constitutionally offensive.29 If, as even the Department of Justice 
appears to agree, moral culpability should be considered before 
attaching criminal liability to a corporation, moral culpability 
must become an established and legally binding element of the 
applicable standard.  
Second, the Principles of Prosecution suffers from a flaw that 
is also found within the Bucy culpability factors for establishing 
corporate criminal liability. Each contains elements for considera-
tion that are outside the applicable scope of inquiry because they 
examine actions by the corporation that occur after the criminal 
conduct under scrutiny. Focusing on the Principles of Prosecution, 
the nine factors may be sorted into the following distinct catego-
ries:  
PRE-OFFENSE OR OFFENSE-SPECIFIC CONDUCT 
 Nature and Seriousness of the Offense 
 Pervasiveness of the Wrongdoing 
 Corporation’s Past History 
 Existence and Adequacy of the Pre-Existing Compliance  
Program 
POST-OFFENSE CONDUCT 
 Timely and Voluntary Disclosure 
 Remedial Actions 
 Collateral Consequences of Prosecution 
 Adequacy of Civil or Regulatory Enforcement 
 Adequacy of Prosecution of Individuals 
Contrary to the full criteria advanced by the Principles of 
Prosecution, only those factors listed in the pre-offense or offense-
specific conduct category are properly considered in determining 
corporate moral culpability. This is because the actions taken by 
the corporation after the discovery of wrongdoing do not offer reli-
able insight into the true ethos of the corporation at the time of 
the underlying offense. For instance, a corporation that was not 
  
 29. See Podgor, supra n. 27, at 170 (emphasizing that the guidelines may be changed 
at any time and are not subject to judicial review). 
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morally culpable at the time a rogue employee committed a crim-
inal act may later attempt to obstruct justice to prevent detection 
of the conduct. While this might properly result in a corporate 
conviction for obstruction of justice, the organization should not 
also be held accountable for the previous acts of the employee. 
Similarly, a corporation that was morally culpable for the acts of 
its employee because it encouraged the illegality does not become 
morally pure merely because it offers remedial amends once the 
behavior is discovered. As such, focusing only on pre-offense and 
offense-specific considerations creates a more reliable mechanism 
for the culpability analysis.  
Drawing on the four factors described above, an analysis of 
whether a corporation encouraged the criminal behavior of its 
employee or agent for purposes of the proposed moral culpability 
element would include consideration of several questions. First, 
what does the nature and seriousness of the offense tell us about 
the corporate ethos? If the offense is minor, the individual may 
have believed he or she would succeed undetected by the corpora-
tion. If, however, the offense is particularly egregious and far 
reaching, it is more likely that the individual believed the conduct 
would be permitted and his or her action would go unpunished 
and unreported by the corporation. Second, was the conduct per-
vasive? The involvement of multiple employees, agents, or units of 
the corporation likely signals a corporate ethos that encouraged, 
or at least tolerated, legally questionable activity. Third, did the 
corporation have a history of past bad acts, and what was the  
response to such activities? If a corporation has an extensive his-
tory of employees and agents engaging in improprieties that go 
unpunished, the corporation may be found to be encouraging, 
even if only indirectly, further criminal conduct. If, however, the 
corporation has a limited history of employee or agent misconduct 
and any discovered misconduct is dealt with swiftly and severely, 
the corporation is likely not engaged in wrongful conduct. Finally, 
did the corporation have a pre-existing and effective compliance 
program? Particularly in today’s enforcement environment, the 
failure to have an effective compliance program sends a strong 
message to employees and agents that enforcing legal obligations 
is not a priority for the organization. Such a message indicates 
the existence of a corporate ethos that encouraged the criminal 
conduct at issue.  
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To be clear, the remaining five post-offense conduct factors 
from the Principles of Prosecution are not irrelevant because they 
remain exceedingly important in determining whether an organi-
zation should—not may—be prosecuted. When the government is 
determining whether an individual may be charged with fraud, 
consideration of whether the victim has received restitution is not 
a factor in the legal analysis of the elements of the offense.30 Such 
remedial measures are considered, however, when the prose-
cution determines how it should exercise its prosecutorial discre-
tion, a purely permissive undertaking.31 In a similar fashion, 
instead of focusing on whether the legal elements of corporate 
criminal liability have been satisfied, the analysis of post-offense 
conduct by a corporation should be relegated to the government’s 
permissive determination of whether to prosecute.32  
IV. CONCLUSION 
In summary, the common law respondeat superior test for 
corporate criminal liability should be expanded beyond the cur-
rent two-prong test to encompass a third prong regarding moral 
culpability. The revised test, which might be termed the moral 
culpability standard, would permit corporate criminal liability as 
described below:  
A corporation shall be criminally liable for the criminal acts 
of its employees or agents when: 
(1) The employee’s or agent’s criminal acts: 
a. Were within the scope of their duties; and 
b. Were intended to benefit the corporation;  
And, 
  
 30. See e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a) (2006) (setting forth the elements the government 
must prove to prosecute a person for committing fraud against the United States, which do 
not include whether restitution has been made).  
 31. See Podgor, supra n. 27, at 168 (explaining that prosecutors have discretion  
regarding ‚whether cases will be plea bargained, dismissed, or tried‛).  
 32. This does not mean that the government may not also consider the first four pre-
offense and offense-specific conduct factors in deciding whether it should prosecute.  
Rather, this Article merely argues that the five post-conduct factors should not be part of 
the proposed common law moral culpability analysis. 
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(2) The corporation is morally culpable for encouraging 
the above-described criminal acts of its employees or 
agents based on an analysis of the following four 
factors: 
a. The nature and seriousness of the offense, 
including the risk of harm to the public;  
b. The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within 
the corporation, including the complicity 
in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by 
corporate management;  
c. The corporation’s history of similar con-
duct, including prior criminal, civil, and 
regulatory enforcement actions against it; 
and 
d. The existence and adequacy of the corpora-
tion’s pre-existing compliance program. 
Such a revised standard increases the burden on the prosecution 
to establish a criminal violation, incorporates a moral culpability 
element into the traditional respondeat superior test, and focuses 
the analysis of whether the corporation is morally culpable on a 
refined and appropriately limited group of pre-offense and  
offense-specific factors. 
This proposal is but one of many currently being considered 
as a remedy to the status quo, and the conclusion of this Article 
will briefly discuss three such proposals and their relationship to 
the moral culpability standard described above. The first is the 
Model Penal Code, which proposes to limit corporate liability to 
those instances in which ‚the commission of the offense was  
authorized, requested, commanded, performed[,] or recklessly tol-
erated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent 
acting [o]n behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office 
or employment.‛33 The second is the standard advocated by An-
drew Weissmann, who would permit corporate criminal liability 
only if ‚a company reasonably should have taken steps to detect 
and deter the criminal action of its employee.‛34 Finally, Ellen 
  
 33. Model Penal Code § 2.07(1)(c) (ALI proposed off. dft. 1962). 
 34. Weissmann, supra n. 8, at 1335; see also Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, 
Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 Ind. L.J. 411, 411 (2007) (arguing that ‚the 
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Podgor has proposed creating an affirmative defense applicable to 
any corporation that has taken all reasonable preventative steps 
in the matter.35  
While the intent of each of these proposals is commendable, a 
more sweeping correction to the respondeat superior standard is 
warranted, particularly given the increasing frequency with 
which corporations are being criminally investigated. The moral 
culpability proposal advanced in this Article incorporates ele-
ments of each of the three alternatives described above. A moral 
culpability standard protects corporations when there was no  
involvement by high managerial agents and prevents prosecution 
of corporations that took all reasonable steps to detect and deter 
criminal acts. Beyond the above alternatives, however, the moral 
culpability standard also protects a corporation that may have 
failed to satisfy one of these standards but that, after analysis of 
the four factors, does not appear to have a corporate ethos that 
encouraged the relevant criminal behavior. Finally, the moral 
culpability test punishes a corporation that might satisfy one of 
the above proposals but that has still demonstrated an ethos that 
encouraged criminal behavior.  
Corporate criminal liability is a unique legal concept that 
presents complex and difficult quandaries because laws created 
for humans are applied to fictitious entities. Nevertheless, crimi-
nal laws can and must be applied to corporations to ensure that 
these organizations, which are growing in ever-increasing size 
and strength, are held accountable for their actions. In extending 
criminal liability to corporations, however, it is important to  
remember that though they are fictitious, corporations are merely 
collections of people who suffer real and significant consequences 
when corporate criminal laws are applied.36 As such, every effort 
must be made to ensure corporate criminal liability is applied to 
  
government should bear the burden of establishing . . . that the corporation failed to have 
reasonable policies and procedures to prevent the employee’s conduct‛). 
 35. Ellen S. Podgor, A New Corporate World Mandates a “Good Faith” Affirmative 
Defense, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1537, 1538 (2007); see also Bucy, supra n. 5, at 1442 (propos-
ing a ‚corporate compliance‛ affirmative defense to prevent prosecution of corporations 
‚that have taken all reasonable steps to discourage illegal corporate acts and encourage 
compliance of the law‛). 
 36. See Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 Stan. L. 
Rev. 271, 277–280 (2008) (describing the collateral consequences of a corporate conviction). 
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organizations in a fair and consistent manner, as if the corpora-
tions were the very people who fill their ranks.  
 
